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Regulation of Uninsured Multiple-Employer
Trusts Under ERISA: An Open Question Again?
The term "uninsured multiple-employer trusts" (MET's)
describes a large and complex field of entities that are established
to offer employee benefits to employees of small employers. By
banding together, these small employers generally pool their resourcbs to provide more economical benefits, and in some cases,
they purchase partial insurance coverage from insurance carriers
at the lower rates given large employers. These uninsured1 M E T
arrangements are typically organized and managed by thirdparty administrators who may be either independent entrepreneurs or insurance company representatives. Uninsured MET's
assume a wide variety of legal forms including trust^,^ unincorporated association^,^ and administrative service corporation^.^
Collectively bargained multiemployer plans are not considered
part of the uninsured MET field discussed here.VI'he benefits
provided through uninsured MET's are usually paid directly from
trust assets derived from employers' and employees' contributions.

Following the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),Qontroversy and alarm7grew
1. The term "uninsured" adds an important distinction to the class of entities under
discussion. Insured multiple-employer trusts pay their benefit obligations through duly
licensed insurance carriers. The financial stability, marketing practices, investment policies, and claims payment procedures of the insurance carriers in turn are regulated by
state insurance laws. Although in some cases uninsured MET's purchase limited insurance coverage, the benefits provided by uninsured MET's are predominantly self-funded.
See Brummond, The Legal Status of Uninsured Noncollectively-Bargained MultipleL. REV.
Employer Welfare Trusts Under ERISA and State Insurance Laws, 28 SYRACUSE
701 (1977).
2. See Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977).
3. See Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
4. See Brummond, supra note 1, a t 701.
5. The "multiemployer" trusts or plans which are formed between a labor union and
more than one employer pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining argreement
are defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 $3(37), 29 U.S.C. $
1002(37) (1976).
6. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified a t 29 U.S.C. $ 5 1001-1381 (1976)) (also
codified in scattered sections of 18, 19, 26 U.S.C.).
7. See David, Employee Benefit Trusts' Growth Alarms Officials; More Failures

\
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as a rapidly expanding number of uninsured MET's claimed exemption from state insurance laws because of the preemption
provisions of ERISA.These uninsured MET's were, for the most
part, viewed by state insurance officials as purely entrepreneurial
venturesqgdeliberately structured to fall within the so-called
"regulatory void" beyond the jurisdiction of state insurance departments. Furthermore, the plan organizers assumed that
ERISA's preemption provisions left the uninsured MET's apparently free from substantial federal regulation since ERISA's vesting and funding requirements do not apply to employee welfare
benefit plans. '"The immediate question was whether state insurance officials could regulate the uninsured MET's, and if they
could, to what extent. The urgency of the question was heightened by the insolvency of two large uninsured MET's. Additionally, several million citizens were believed to be enrolled in other
MET programs for which there was no effective regulation.I1Con--

-

Feared (pts. 1, 2), Bus. INS., Feb. 21, 1977, a t 1, Mar. 7, 1977, a t 1. A series of articles
and editorials covering the uninsured multiple-employer trust question and related court
cases appeared in Business Insurance between Feb. 21, 1977 and Jan. 23, 1978. See also
H.R. REP. NO. 1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.9417851. In a more recent update regarding the increasing magnitude of the uninsured MET
problem, Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) ERISA Preemption Task Force, reported to the House Subcommittee on
Labor Standards that the NAIC conservatively estimates that more than 600,000 employees and their beneficiaries are enrolled under "employee welfare benefit plans" of uninsured MET's. Anderson noted that other estimates range as high as three million people.
Furthermore, approximately $300 million in contributions are collected annually by promoters of uninsured MET's. At least 30 MET's or affiliated organizations were knoun to
be operating in mid-1978. Oversight on ERISA, 1978: Hearings on Public Law 93-406
Before the Subconm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 650 (statement of National Association of Insurance Commissioners
by Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force) [hereinafter
cited as ERISA Oversight ?learings].
8. ERISA supersedes any and all state laws relating to employee benefit plans.
ERISA 514, 29 U.S.C. 4 1144 (1976). See text accompanying notes 20-28 infra.
9. The choice of language used here, which may have certain pejorative connotations,
is not intended to imply that those individuals who administer or represent uninsured
MET'S are necessarily unscrupulous; rather, the assertion is that the business and legal
structures provide incentive for conduct injurious to the working public.
lo. ERISA $4 201(1), 301(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § § 1051(1), 1081(a)(l) (1976). Employee
welfare benefit plans need only comply with ERISA's reporting and disclosure provisions
and abide by the Act's fiduciary standards. Employee pension benefit plans, however, are
subject to all of ERISA's provisions.
11. On Feb. 2, 1977, the National Multiple Employers' Foundation, a Californiabased MET, filed a petition in bankruptcy. Approximately two months later, a second
California-based MET, the Hospital Welfare Association Trust, filed an action seeking the
appointment of a federal receiver because of its insolvent position. See David, Employee
Benefit Trusts' Growth Alarms Officials; More Failures Feared (pt. I), Bus. INS., Feb. 21,

9131

ERISA

915

sequently, state insurance departments mobilized their resources, went to the courts, and won important victoriesI2involving uninsured MET's that were purportedly, but not in fact, established or maintained by employee organizations.13 These
bogus em ployee-organization MET's, however, comprise only a
segment of the much larger field of uninsured MET's.
The apparent judicial consensus permitting state insurance
departments to regulate bogus employee-organization MET's did
not resolve the jurisdictional question for all uninsured MET's.
Although the Labor Department" favors state control of bogus
employee-organization MET's, it has been reluctant to relinquish
jurisdiction over other portions of the uninsured MET field.'The
Labor Department's position has prompted some uninsured
MET's to restructure their operations to conform with the judicial decisions to date.'"
Another reason for the uncertainty regarding the regulation
of uninsured MET's is that, until recently, no court had ruled
whether an employee benefit plan allegedly established or maintained by an association of employers was a valid ERISA-covered
plan. However, in January 1979 a federal district court in California determined that an uninsured MET established and maintained by an employer association was a valid ERISA-covered
employee benefit plan." Interestingly, in spite of the federal
1977, a t 1; David, Court Case Could Set Self-funded Trust Rules, Bus. INS., Apr. 18, 1977,
a t 1. It is also estimated that three million people are presently receiving welfare benefits
from uninsured MET's. Between Jan. 1977 and June 1978 five major uninsured MET's
went insolvent. The unpaid claims of just two of those insolvent MET's were estimated
a t in excess of $7.5 million. See ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t 659 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task
Force).
12. See Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977);
Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977).
13. An employee organization MET refers to an employee benefit plan established
or maintained by an employee organjzation as defined in ERISA 9 3(4), 29 U.S.C. (j
1002(4) (1976). See text accompanying note 42 infra.
14. Although the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury jointly administer ERISA according to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. $ 9 1201-1204 (1976), direct supervision of uninsured MET'S originates from the Administrator of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs a t the Labor Department.
15. Letter from James D. Hutchinson, Labor Department Administrator, to Willie
R. Barnes. California Commissioner of Corporations (Jul. 4, 1976), reprinted in 119761
PENS.REP. (BNA) No. 96, a t R-1 (Jul. 26, 1976).
16. David, Trusts Retrench in Wake of Court Decisions, Bus. INS., Oct. 17, 1977, a t
1.
17. Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Security Health Plan, No. 78-1926 RMT
(GX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1979).
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court determination, the Labor Department has nonetheless
taken the position that the plan in question is not a legitimate
ERISA plan. lx
This recent turn of events intensifies the uncertainty surrounding the jurisdictional issue of uninsured MET's. The question persists whether state insurance officials can regulate uninsured MET's, and if so, to what extent.
This Comment focuses on past and present judicial, legislative, and regulatory efforts to define the respective roles of the
state and federal governments in regulating uninsured MET's.
First, a brief over vie^'^ summarizing ERISA's preemption provisions and the two conflicting interpretations of those provisions
will be presented. The focus will then shift to an analysis of court
decisions in the uninsured MET field that have attempted to
define employee benefit plans. Subsequently, the central importance of the substantive/defihitional conflict in defining an employee benefit plan will be considered. Finally, alternatives will
be presented for resolving the uninsured MET regulatory controversy.

11. ERISA's PREEMPTION
PROVISIONS
AND CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS
Section 514 of ERISA expressly declares Congress' intent to
occupy the field of employee benefit plans.20The general preemptive language of section 514(a), the "relation clause," states in
broad terms that ERISA "shall supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."21
18. Letter from Ian D. Lanoff, Labor Department Adminstrator, to Thomas J .
Wilkie, Administrator of Insurance and Prepaid Benefits Trust (Jul. 23, 1979), reprinted
in 119791 P E N S REP.
.
(BNA) No. 250, a t R-26 (Jul. 30, 1979).
19. FOPa more detailed analysis of the larger question of ERISA's preemption of state
laws generally, see Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.23 (1978); Turza &
Halloway. Preemption of State Laws IJnder the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 28 CATH.U.L. REV.163 (1979). For a discussion of ERISA preemption of state
insurance regulation. see Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation
[Tnder ERISA. 62 IOWA
L. REV.57 (1976); Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation
by ERISA, 13 FORUM
652 (1978).
20. ERISA's preemption provisions are codified a t 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-(d) (1976).
21. ERISA 5 Fil4(a), 29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (1976). The term "state law" as used in the
preemption provisions includes "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state action having the effect of law, of any state." Id. 9 514(c)(l),29 U.S.C. 5 1144(c)(l).Moreover, the term "state" is defined to include "a state, any political subdivision thereof, or
any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly,
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The "savings clause," section 5l4(b)(Z)(A), reserves or saves
the states' regulatory power over insurance matters by clarifying
that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any state which regulates
~~
in an apparent atinsurance, banking, or s e ~ u r i t i e s . "Congress,
tempt to reinforce the broad preemptive language of the relation
clause and simultaneously circumscribe the scope of the savings
clause,23included section 5l4(b)(2)(B), the "deemer clause." The
deemer clause provides in relevant part: "Neither an employee
benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer,
bank, trust company, or investment company . . . ."" The extent to which the deemer clause qualifies the savings clause has
been the focal point of much of the preemption-related litigat i ~ n Finally,
. ~ ~ section 514(d) states that ERISA shall neither
supplant nor impinge upon other existing federal laws? In the
the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans . . . ." Id. 8 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. 9
1144(c)(2).
22. Id. 8 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. 4 1144(b)(2)(A).
23. Both the original House and Senate versions of ERISA provided for limited
preemption of state law. A broader preemption provision was subsequently drafted and
adopted in conference committee. Senator Jacob Javits explained the reasoning behind
the change in these words:
Both House and Senate bills provided for prtemption of s t a t e law,
but-with one major exception appearing in the House Bill-defined the perimeters of preemption in relation t o the areas regulated by the bill. Such a
formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of state
action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as opening the door to
multiple and potentially conflicting state laws hastily contrived to deal with
some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not clearly
connected to the Federal regulatory scheme.
Although the desirability of further regulation-at either the state or Federal level-undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emergence
of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the
displacement of state action in the field of private employee benefit programs.
120 CONG.REC.29,942 (1974).
24. ERISA 5 514(b)(2)(B),29 U.S.C. 8 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976).
25. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U S .
980 (1978); Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977);
Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 484 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977); Wayne Chem., Inc. v.
Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd as modified, 567 F.2d
692 (7th Cir. 1977); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd,
571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 19771, cert. denied. 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
26. ERISA 4 514(d), 29 U.S.C. 4 1144(d) (1976). The subsection states: "Nothing in
this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States (except a s provided in sections 1031 and 1137(b) of
this title) or any rule or regulation issued under any such law."
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insurance context, section 514(d) is frequently referred to as recognizing the validity of the McCarran-Ferguson Act," which established the national policy of state primacy in insurance regulation .2s
In the application of ERISA's preemption provisions to the
vast array of entities allegedly operating as employee benefit
plans, two conflicting interpretations of section 514 have
emerged: a broad view and a narrow view of preemption.

A.

Broad Interpretation of Preemption

One of the strongest and most frequently cited judicial pronouncements in favor of total preemption is Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Barnes. 29 In Hew let t-Packard the administrators of various
ERISA health benefit plans challenged the authority of the defendant Commissioner of Corporations to regulate their programs
under the California Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act
of 197530on the ground that the Act had been preempted by
ERISA. The commissioner contended that neither the language
of ERISA's preemption provisions nor the Act's legislative history
mandated the preemption of state legislation, such as the KnoxKeene Act, that regulates health services. He further argued that
because the Knox-Keene Act regulates the business of insurance,
it was precluded from preemption by virtue of the savings
clause? Following a careful analysis of section 514's plain language,:j2and the statute's legislative history,:Vhe court sided with
27. 15 U.S.C. (34 1011-1015 (1976).
28. The McCarran-Ferguson Act further provides that "[nlo Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance." Id.
29. 4'25 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 831 (1978).
30. Knox-Keene Act, CAL.HEALTH
& SAFETY
CODE$5 1340-1345 (West Cum. Supp.
1971-1977).
31. A third argument raised by the defendant commissioner was that if ERISA were
to be construed so broadly as to preempt state regulation of health care services, then §
514(a) would be violative of the tenth amendment of the Constitution. The court disposed
of this argument by noting that other courts have repeatedly held that the tenth amendment does not limit Congress' application of the commerce power to private activity. 425
F. Supp. at 1301.
32. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the words "relate to" as contained in Q 514(a) of ERISA were "vague and ambiguous." On the contrary, the court
concluded that Congress could not have "chosen any more precise language to express its
intent to preempt a state statute such as Knox-Keene insofar as it seeks to regulate
ERISA-covered employee benefit plans . . . ." Id. a t 1297.
33. The district court judge relied primarily on statements from conference commit-

9131

ERISA

919

the plan administrators and ruled that the Knox-Keene Act was
preempted to the extent that it applied to ERISA-covered employee welfare benefit plans. The court stated:
In seeking to regulate plaintiff's plans pursuant to Knox-Keene
under the theory that the statute applies to and that such plans
constitute "insurance," defendant contravenes the clear intent
of Section 514(a) and (b) of ERISA that employee benefit plans,
so dubbed or under any other name, be free of state reg~lation.:'~

Thus, the Hewlett-Packard preemption test requires that a state
insurance statute be preempted whenever it relates to a valid
ERISA employee benefit plan.

R. Narrow interpretation of Preemption
In contrast to the expansive approach taken by the court in
Hewlett-Packard, the court in Wadsworth u. Whalandti5adopted
a narrow view of preemption. In Wadsworth representatives of

several health and welfare funds objected to a New Hampshire
lawM that required all insurers issuing group health insurance
policies in the state to include coverage for mental illness and
emotional disorders. Since ERISA does not impose a similar requirement and because the benefit plans involved were ERISAcovered, the plan representatives sought to enjoin the defendant
Commissioner of Insurance from enforcing the requirement.'" The
plaintiffs argued that to directly regulate group insurance policies
by imposing mandatory coverages is to exercise indirect control
over the benefits an employee receives from his employee welfare
benefit plan. Hence, they contended that a state insurance statute that indirectly relates to an ERISA employee benefit plan
tee members as to the legislation's purpose. Congressman John Den.t, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Labor and Education Committee, was quoted as
stating in part:
Finally I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement
of this legislation. the reservation to Federal authority the sole power t o regulate
the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round
out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting
and inconsistent state and local regulations.
120 CONG.REC.29,197 (1974). See also id. a t 29,933 (remarks of Senator Harrison Williams, Jr.).
34. 425 F. Supp. a t 1300.
35. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
36. N.H. REV.STAT.ANN. 4 415:18-a (Supp. 1977).
37. Cf. Insurer's Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921, 956 (D. Minn.
1976) (injunction denied because no clear conflict existed between challenged state insurance law and ERISA).
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should trigger the preemption provision. The trial court disagreed.
The First Circuit affirmed the lower court decision by concluding that the deemer clause did not forbid states from indirectly affecting employee benefit plans by regulating group insurance policies. The court reasoned that a contrary holding would
completely emasculate the savings clause and contravene the
express objective of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to uphold state
primacy in the regulation of insurance.

The Hewlett-Pachard court's decision that a state insurance
law is preempted whenever it relates to a valid ERISA employee
benefit plan naturally requires that the first determination be
whether the plan in question is a valid ERISA-defined plan. In
cases involving uninsured MET'S, the courts have concerned
themselves primarily with ascertaining whether specific plans
qualify as legitimate ERISA employee benefit plans. These courts
have encountered complex definitional questions because of the
complicating role played by third-party administrators or entrepreneurs who substantially minimize or eliminate the participation of employers and employees in the operation of the plan.
Employer or employee participation in the establishment or
maintenance of a plan, however, is a prerequisite for qualification
as an employee benefit plan.

A.

ERISA Definitions

Specifically, ERISA defines an employee benefit plan as an
employee welfare benefit plan, an employee pension benefit
plan,:%r a plan that combines the two? An employee welfare
benefit plan means "any plan, fund, or program . . . established
or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization,
or by both . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherrvise [any of a number of enumerated benefits 1."-"'Further38. Employee pension benefit plans are beyond the scope of this Comment. They are
defined in ERISA 0 3(2). 29 U.S.C. 4 1002(2) (1976).
39. Id. 0 3 0 ) . 29 U.S.C. 0 1002(3).
40. Id. j 3(1), 29 U.S.C. 4 1002(1) (emphasis added). The benefits specified by the
statute include "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness. accident. disabilitv, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
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more, " It 1he term 'employer' means any person acting directly
as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting for an employer in such ~apacity."~'
Finally, regarding "employee organization," ERISA states:
The term "employee organization" means any labor union
or any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee, association, group, or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning an employee
benefit plan, or other matters incidental to employment relationships; or any employees' beneficiary association organized
for the purpose in whole or in part, of establishing such a p1an.l"

B. Wayne Chemical-First Purported Plan
Held Outside of ERISA S Scope
One of the first courts to examine the ERISA definitions and
conclude that an alleged ERISA plan was not a valid employee
benefit plan was the Seventh Circuit in Wayne Chemical, Inc. v.
Columbus Agenc.y Service Corp. J:'The suit was brought in behalf
of a plan beneficiary who had become severely paralyzed in an
accident when he was eighteen years old and still covered by a
group medical insurance policy purchased by his father's employer. Shortly before the mishap, the defendant service corporation had formally transferred the policy from a conventional insurance carrier to National Multiple Employers Foundation
(NMEF), alleged to be a multiple-employer welfare trust. The
quadriplegic son was later notified that, according to the terms
of the NMEF policy, his benefits would end on his twentieth
birthday, a result contrary to Indiana law." The district court
found the NMEF plan to be a legitimate ERISA plan and ruled
that the state law t h a t would have permitted recovery was
services . . . ." Id. 4 .3(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 5 1002(1)(A).
I t should be noted that this Comment primarily focuses upon uninsured MET'S t h a t
provide benefits to their participants or beneficiaries through means other than insurance.
41. Id. 4 3(5), 29 U.S.C. 4 1002(5).
42. Id. 4 3(4), 29 U.S.C. 4 1002(4).
43. 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
44. IND.CODE4 27-8-5-10(B)(4)(1976). This statute requires that any group hospital
and medical policy which permits termination of coverage once a dependent reaches a
given age must also provide that the coverage cannot be terminated "while the child is
and continues to be both (a) incapable of self-sustaining employment by reason of mental
retardation or physical handicap a n d (b) chiefly dependent upon the employee or member
for support and maintenance." Id.
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preempted; nevertheless, the court granted relief under its power
to fashion federal common law.'"
On interlocutory appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court decision, but on different grounds. The court held
that NMEF was not a valid ERISA plan because the employer,
Wayne Chemical, had neither transacted business with any trust
or plan4%or participated in any employee benefit plan.'? On the
contrary, Wayne Chemical had only contracted with the defendant service corporation for the procurement of insurance. Consequently, NMEF, which had been selling insurance without a certificate of authority, and the agent service corporation were held
subject to Indiana law?
The Seventh Circuit also stated that the question of
"employer" or "employee organization" establishment, maintenance, and participation requirements was apparently not addressed in the reports and debates of ERISA? The court, therefore, chose to forego any discussion of the legislative history. Ironically, the court then proceeded to base its opinion upon an unusual retroactive declaration of legislative intent contained in an
activity report issued by the House Committee on Education and
Labor."'The report notes that "certain entrepreneurs have undertaken to market insurance products to employers and employees
a t large, claiming these products to be ERISA-covered plans."
The report continues:
To the extent that such programs fail to meet the definition
of an "employee benefit plan," state regulation of them is not
preempted by section 514, even though such state action is
45. The district court adopted the appropriate Indiana statute as federal common law
based upon Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U . S . 934
(1964) (state law may be resorted to and adopted as a federal rule of decision if compatible
with national policy).
46. The court found no indication from the record that any trust or plan had been
created. Importantly, the communications from the defendant service corporation to the
plaintiff/employer stated that Wayne Chemical was the former's policyholder. 567 F.2d
at 694-99.
47. The court reasoned that Wayne Chemical could not have been a participating
employer even if a trust or plan had existed because Wayne Chemical neither knew of the
existence of such a plan until long after the formal transfer of insurance carriers nor did
Wayne Chemical enter into an agreement to establish a plan. Id. a t 699.
48. See IND.CODE5 27-4-5-2(c)(2) (1976). Indiana's unauthorized insurer's act provides that if anv unauthorized insurer defaults on an insurance contract governed by
Indiana law, then anv person who assisted in the procurement of the insurance is personally liable on the coverage.
49. 567 F.2d at 699 n.11.
50. H.R. REP. 94-1785. . w p m note 7, a t 33.
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barred with respect to the plans which purchase these
"products."

....
We are mindful of the potentially harmful effects of an
overly broad interpretation of the term employee benefit plan
when coupled with the policy of section 514. As we have already
noted, we do not believe that the statute and legislative history
will support the inclusion of what amounts to commercial products within the umbrella of the definition. Where a plan is, in
effect, an entrepreneurial venture, it is outside the policy of
section 514 for reasons we have already stated. In short, to be
properly characterized as an ERISA employee benefit plan, a
plan must satisfy the definitional requirement of section 3(3) in
both form and substance . . . .51

In view of the similarity of the wording in the activity report to
the fact situation in Wa-yne Chemical, the court found it unnecessary to more rigorously analyze "employer" or "employee organization" establishment, maintenance, and participation requirements.
C.

Hamberlin-Circumstances

Dictate Result

In Hamberlin v. VIP Insurance Trust," the United States
District Court in Arizona was presented with a fact situation that
it considered to be so clearly repugnant to ERISA's purposes that
it offered only a conclusory analysis with supporting quotes from
the activity report to support its holding. The beneficiaries of a
group health and accident policy brought suit against the defendant insurance trust and defendant trustees for alleged violations
of ERISA. Although the parties agreed that the defendant insurance trust was a valid ERISA plan, the defendants moved for
dismissal on the ground that the alleged violations involved a
simple contract action t h a t should properly be tried in state
court. The State Insurance Commissioner filed an amicus brief
arguing that control had not been preempted because the defendant trust did not qualify as an ERISA-covered employee benefit
plan. Hence, the threshold and dispositive question was whether
the federal court possessed subject matter jurisdiction in the case.
The court concluded that it did not.
In reaching its decision, the court placed considerable weight
51. Id. at 48,quoted in Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d
at 699, 700.
52. 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977).
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on the apparent motives of the plan organizers and also on the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the VIP Insurance
Trust." Although the trust organizers sought the endorsement of
various unrelated employers and groups, they marketed the policies directly to individual employees who financed their own policies. The employers played no meaningful role in the creation or
maintenance of the trust. The court characterized the plan as an
entrepreneurial scheme put together to protect business commissions, maintain business relations, and escape state insurance
department supervision and auditing.5J The court observed:
"[The defendant trustees] were simply not acting as agents of
or on behalf of the employers or employer groups as contemplated
by 29 U.S.C. $ 1002(5). They were acting in the interest of and
on behalf of the business of Galbraith & Green, their e m p l ~ y e r . " ~ ~
Moreover, the court perceived the conduct of the VIP trustees as
deliberate self-dealing, which it would not countenance. Therefore, in much the same manner as the Wayne Chemical court, the
Hamberlin court anchored its conclusion upon the language of
the activity report that suggests that entrepreneurial ventures are
outside the scope of ERISA.56

D. Bell- Emergence of Judicial Criteria
In a third case, Bell v. Employee Security Benefit
Association," an unusual factual setting again arguably mandated the court's conclusion. For instance, the defendant uninsured MET was consuming seventy-two percent of each dollar
collected for payment of commissions and administrative expens e ~ Furthermore,
. ~ ~
the defendant never presented a defense,
thereby allowing a default judgment to be entered." In other
53. The original VIP Trust was a MET insured by Old Republic Life Insurance Co..
After Old Republic cancelled VIP Trust's group coverage, the insurance brokers established a new self-funded trust with itself acting as administrator for a 15% commission
rather than replacing Old Republic with an authorized insurer. The court found that the
trustees of the newly formed VIP Trust, while acting in that capacity, negotiated with
themselves as corporate officers of the insurance brokerage an administration and management agreement. The trustees, the court concluded, were acting solely in the interest
of the insurance brokerage. Id. a t 1198.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1199 (quoting H.R. REP.94-1785, supra note 7, at48). See text accompanying not.e 51 supra.
57. 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
58. Id. at 384-85. See also note 61 and accompanying text infra.
59. Because Emplovee Security Benefit Association (ESBA) was doing a minimal
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words, in light of the unique fact situation in Bell, the court had
no reasonable alternative but to conclude <thatthe defendant
MET was not a valid employee benefit plan. The defendant Employee Security Benefit Association (ESBA), an unincorporated
association, was soliciting agents in numerous states, including
Kansas, to offer its medical and death benefits plan, which it
advertised as a "self-funded, self-adjusting Employee Benefit
Plan established under Public Law 93-406."" Upon learning that
ESBA was paying excessive commission rates to its marketing
representatives, disbursing substantial plan funds for administrative expenses," and enrolling as plan members individuals
from a wide spectrum of unrelated occupations," the plaintiff
insurance commissioner commenced suit to enjoin ESBA's business activities until it conformed to the state's various insurance
statutes and regulations. Unlike the superficial analyses applied
by the Wayne Chemical and Hamberlin courts, the Bell court set
forth a two-pronged analytical approach to, first, determine the
scope of the preemption provisions and, second, ascertain
whether ESBA's program was "insurance" or an "employee benefit plan .'63
After a review of the language in section 514 and its legislative history, the court subscribed to the expansive view of
preemption announced by the Hewlett-Packard court. Concerning the more difficult question whether ESBA's program was
"insurance" or an "employee benefit plan," the court began its
analysis by acknowledging that most employee benefit plans
comply with the criteria of a general definition of insuranceY The
amount of business in Kansas as compared with other states, ESBA's counsel decided to
default in Bell and focus full attention to litigation involving ESBA in Nevada. Letter
from Curtis Lee Brooke, Counsel for ESBA, to the author (Oct. 3, 1979).
60. 437 F. Supp. a t 384.
61. D.M.A., Inc., an agency organized by two of ESBA's officers to market ESBA's
program. received 50% of first year member contributions and 17 %% on renewal contributions. Benefit Services Corp., a corporation organized by individuals with substantial ties
to ESBA's organizers, provided administrative services to ESBA in exchange for a 22%
commission on all contributions received. Id. a t 384-85.
62. A sampling of ESBA's members in Kansas included a contractor, a self-employed
carpenter, a teacher's aide, a self-employed truck driver, and a sewer department employee. Id. a t 385.
63. Id.
64. The court referred to the conclusion of one author who proposed that a general
description of insurance would ensure the following: (a) consideration (premium), (b)
fortuitous event. (c) a group of people with identical interests more or less equally exposed
to the same risks, (d) a shifting of that risk to the insurer, and (e) a distribution of the
risk to others similarly exposed. Id. a t 389.
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court then succinctly inquired: "Given that most employee benefit plans meet standard definitions of insurance, and that Congress meant to preempt state regulation of employee benefit plans
without otherwise affecting state regulation of insurance, how are
we to tell exactly what Congress meant to preempt?7765
Several factors led the court to the conclusion that just as a
state cannot regulate an employee benefit plan by calling it insurance, neither could ESBA merchandise an insurance program
simply by terming it an employee benefit plan." The two principal factors shaping the court's decision were the program's substantive nature and the program's technical nonconformity with
the ERISA definition of an employee benefit plan. First, from a
substantive standpoint, the court surveyed pre-ERISA literature
and determined that the "pre-ERISA concept of an 'employee
benefit plan' was easily distinguished from the concept of
6.
~nsurance."'~~
Moreover, employee benefit plans before 1974 were
considered to be nonprofit, nonadvertising programs provided by
already existing employee groups rather than by employers." The
court then identified five general standards typifying the employee benefit plan concept as it existed when Congress adopted
ERISA's preemption provision^.^^ Based upon those standards,
the court determined that it was "clear" that ESBA's program
was not an employee benefit plan but was instead "disguised
insurance ."7"
After examining the specific wording of the ERISA provisions, the Bell court also concluded that ESBA's program did not
qualify as an employee benefit plan as that term is defined in
65. Id.
66. Id. at 390.
67. One pre-ERISA article listed the following characteristics as distinguishing employee benefit plans from insurance: (1) funds not open to the public, (2) no advertising
or solicitation. (3) voluntary membership, and (4) a non-profit operation. Id..See 28 ARK.
L. REV.515, 516 (1975).
68. 437 F. Supp. at 390.
69. The court stated:
Clearly, the [employer benefit plan1 concept as it existed when Congress
passed the preemption provisions of ERISA involved the following characteristics: (1) it was provided by an employer or homogeneous employee organization,
such as a union; (b) it was non-commercial in nature; (c) it did not involve
solicitation; (d) it was not intended to be actuarially sound; (e) because the
employees could look only to the fund, and not to the provider of that fund, the
rates were substantially lower than insurance rates.
Id. at 391.
70. Id. at 392.
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section 3(3) of ERISA.?'Although ESBA's program indisputably
qualified under the medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits
provision,72the court found that the program failed to qualify as
having been established or maintained by either an employeri"or
an employee organization." In finding that ESBA's program was
neither established nor maintained by an employee organization,
the court relied primarily on reasoning supplied by the Labor
Department in its amicus brief.75
THE SUBSTANTIVE/DEFINITIONAL
CONFLICT
IV. SHAPING

The holding in Bell that ESBA was not a valid ERISA employee benefit plan was based on dual lines of analysissubstantive and definitional. Fortunately, both lines of analysis
when applied to that particular fact setting compelled the same
conclusion. In other words, the substantive analysis in Bell led to
the conclusion that ESBA was doing the business of insurance.
71. 29 U.S.C. $ 1002(3) (1976).
72. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
73. See note 41 and accompanying text supra. The court summarily concluded that
ESBA was not established or maintained by employers since ESBA did not employ those
persons who purchased its benefits coverage. In addition, ESBA did not act directly or
indirectly for the benefit of employers who hired ESBA plan members. 437 F. Supp. a t
393.
74. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. The court had some difficulty in
determining that the ESBA plan was not established or maintained by an employee
organization because of the circular definition in 4 3(4) of ERISA. Specifically, the term
"employee organization" is defined in terms of the plan provided. The term "plan" is
defined in terms of who provides it. Because of the ruling in Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43,431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977), which states that no statute
may be construed in a manner so as to render a portion superfluous, the court felt constrained to define the term "employees' beneficiary association." Based upon an examination of legislation preceding ERISA and portions of the Internal Revenue Code, the court
identified the "commonality of interest" element as being a necessary requisite for an
employees' benefit association. Since ESBA enrolled virtually anyone in its program who
was employed, the court found no commonality of interest in ESBA's program. 437 F.
Supp. a t 393-96.
75. Memorandum of Secretary of Labor, Amicus Curiae, Bell v. Employee Security
REP. (BNA)
Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977), reprinted in 119771 PENS.
No. 150, a t R-1 (Aug. 15, 1977). Because ESBA did not claim to be an employer, employer
association, or labor union, the Labor Department's brief examined whether ESBA qualified as an employee organization. The Department first argued that ESBA was not an
employee representation committee or similar organization in which employees participate and which deals with employers. Second, the Department contended that ESBA was
not an employee beneficiary association because the program's members lacked any kind
of employment "commonality of interest." The commonality requirement was adopted
because of its use in similarly worded sections of ERISA's predecessor, the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act. See Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No.
85-836. Ej 3. 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1976).
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The definitional analysis also precluded ESBA's classification as
a n employee benefit plan because ESBA did not comply
with ERISA's definitions of employer or employee organization.
Perhaps because the circumstances of the case did not require a
more detailed analysis, the Bell court failed to consider that fact
settings may arise in which the two lines of analysis would lead
to opposite results. For example, based on the Bell opinion, a t
least. two types of cases would merit further inspection by the
court: (1) an uninsured MET established or maintained by a
definitionally conforming employee organization or (2) an uninsured MET established or maintained by an association of employers. Either type of case, if accompanied by the appropriate
fact setting, would pose the classic conflict: a valid employee
benefit plan (measured by definitional standards) that is transacting insurance business (measured by substantive standards).
Such a case would create a direct conflict between the McCarranFerguson Act mandate that the business of insurance be regulated by the states and ERISA's broad preemption provisions
that exclusively reserve to the federal government supervision
over all employee benefit plans. In none of the cases considered
thus far did the fact situations pose such a conflict; rather, those
cases involved transparent attempts to circumvent state insurance laws for the sole purpose of furthering individuals' selfinterest a t the expense of the public.
The recent case of Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v.
Security Health Plan (IPBT (I)),'%ith its pending sequel (ZPBT
(11)),77
presents a fact setting in which the substantive/
definitional conflict is clear and inescapable. In IPBT (I)the
plaintiff trust sued the defendant health-care provider and others
in a contract d i s p ~ t e . ~ T h
defendants
e
moved to have the action
dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff trust was not a valid
ERISA employee benefit plan. Relying primarily upon
Hamberlin and Bell, the defendants attempted to characterize
Insurance and Prepaid Benefits Trust's (IPBT) origin and mode
of operation as essentially the same as those prior plans, which
were declared invalid employee benefit plans. The defendants
76. No. 78-1926 RMT (GX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1979).
77. Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Marshall, No. CV 7903029 RMT (PX)
(C.D. Cal.. filed Aug. 9. 1979).
78. The plaintiff trust alleged that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties by
mishandling funds. Contrarv to the provisions of the agreement entered into by the two
parties, the defendants allegedly wrongfully appropriated plan funds for their own purposes rather than providing benefits to the plan's participants and beneficiaries.
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also argued, adopting precisely the same substantive analysis
used by the Bell court, that IPBT complied with no more than
one of the five general standards that typified the employee benefit plan concept as it existed when Congress adopted ERISA.i8
Moreover, the defendants alleged that: (1) the IPBT plan was
entirely commercial in nature, (2) IPBT "products" were marketed directly to the public in the same manner that insurance
is solicited, (3) the IPBT plan was intended to be actuarially
sound," and (4) IPBT's coverage rates were lower than insurance
rates. The fifth criterion that the plan be provided by an employer or homogeneous employee organization was concededly a
debatable issue
The plaintiff trust successfully countered the defendants' allegations and reasoning, that is its substantive analysis, by arguing that IPBT was "an employee benefit plan as defined under
ERISA."" The IPBT counsel explained that in December 1977
the single trust (IPBT) was divided into five successor trusts
under the control of a benefit committee that was empowered to
organize and manage the trusts? Each trust is allegedly an organization of employers within a specific industry. Participating
employers are chosen from the ranks of the five individual trusts
. ~ ~ the plainto serve as members of the benefit c ~ m m i t t e eThus,
tiff trust contended that it complied with the definition of an
employee benefit plan formed by an association of emp10yers.~~
Having reviewed the extensive memoranda of points and
79. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
80. The absurd implication here is that actuarial soundness is not desirable for employee benefit plans. Although it may be true that insurance carriers are required to
remain actuarially sound and that employee benefit plans are not, the Bell court c o ~ l d
not reasonably have meant that an employee benefit plan's intention to be actuarially
sound could defeat its ERISA status.
81. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities a t 17-20, Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Security Health Plan, No. 78-1926 RMT (GX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29,
1979).
82. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities a t 4, Insurance & Prepaid
Benefits Trust v. Security Health Plan, No. 78-1926 RMT (GX) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1979)
(emphasis added).
83. Id. a t 6.
84. Complaint for Plaintiff a t 2, Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Marshall, No.
CV 7903029 R M T (PX) (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 9, 1979).
85. According to the trust agreements under which IPBT is organized, the governing
board or "benefit committee" is comprised of participating employers in the trust. The
benefit committee is authorized and empowered to adopt benefit plans, set rates, establish
rules for participation, and contract for services with outside organizations. Benefit committee members may be removed by the vote of a majority of the participating employers.
Id. a t 7-8.
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authorities from both sides, the court ruled that IPBT was an
employee benefit plan under section 3(3) of ERISAXhndtherefore subject to the provisions of ERISA. Although the court chose
to rule from the bench and not to write an opinion, it did adopt
findings of fact and conclusions of law.x7It is unfortunate that the
court did not prepare an opinion explaining its holding since
IPBT (I) is the first case of a n adjudication of an employer association uninsured M E T Y
To further add to the uncertainty created by IPBT (I), the
Labor Department in July of 1979-six months after IPBT
(I)-sent the administrator of IPBT an advisory opinion. The
opinion stated that in spite of the holding in IPBT (I),the Department did not consider IPBT to be a valid ERISA-covered
employee benefit plan.RgIPBT filed an action on August 9, 1979,
against the Secretary of Labor seeking declaratory relief and a
court mandate ordering the Labor Department to recognize IPBT
under ERISA.
In its advisory opinion, the Labor Department states that a
multiple-employer plan exists where a "cognizable" group or association of employers establishes a benefit program for their
employees, where the employees jointly establish a program with
an employee organization, or where the employers subscribe to a
.~~~
to the
plan established by an employee a s s o c i a t i ~ n According
86. 29 U.S.C. $ 1002(3) (1976).
87. Settlement negotiations between the two parties commenced before the court's
decree was entered. Although the plaintiff trust was apparently willing to settle when i t
became apprised of the defendant health-care provider's unstable financial condition,
both parties submitted complete memoranda of points and authorities and requested that
the judge rule on the trust's ERISA status. Only after the court's decision on that issue
was announced did the parties present the court with a consent judgment for its approval.
Telephone int.erview with Claude J . Dorias, Counsel for Insurance and Prepaid Benefits
Trust (Aug. 16. 1979).
88. Although IPBT (I) was the first judicially resolved uninsured MET case involving
an "emplover associat,ion," a t least two other cases were settled out of court. The case of
California v. Aid Fringe Benefits Group Trust, No. C 77-2296 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1979), was
removed to federal court. where a stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction
were entered. California v. 3/33 Group Benefit Trust, No. 243.15B (San Francisco, Cal.
Super. Ct,, filed Sept. 6, 1977), was brought in state court before being settled.
89. Letter from Ian D. Lanoff, Labor Department Administrator, to Thomas J .
Wilkie, Insurance and Prepaid Benefits Trust Administrator (July 23, 1979), reprinted in
119791 PENS.REP. (BNA) No. 250, at R-26 (Jul. 30, 1979).
90. The last paragraph of the Department's advisory opinion states:
It is the Department of Labor's view, based on the definitional provisions
of ERISA as well as the overall statutory scheme, that a multiple employer plan
exists where a cognizable group or association of employers establishes a benefit
program for the emplovees of member employers, or where several employers
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Department, each of t h e above situations involves a n
"organizational relationship" among the employers, employees,
or both. This reasoning is rooted in the "commonality of interest"
argument presented by the Department in Bell,s1 an argument
that the Bell court had some difficulty in adopting.g2It is troubling that the Department now reasons that when several unrelated employers execute identical trust agreements with an independent third party as a means of funding welfare benefits and
there is no "concerted 'sponsor' or 'settlor' activity," the resulting
trust is not an employee benefit plan under ERISA. The flaw in
the Department's reasoning arises because of its failure to consider the conjunction "or" in ERISA's definition of an employee
benefit plan as any plan, fund, or program "established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organizati~n."~:~
It may
be argued that when an independent third party seeks out and
brings together employers from unrelated areas to "establish" a
multiple-employer plan, the formation process is initiated and
directed by the third party rather than by the employers themselves. Accordingly, the arrangement supposedly does not qualify
as an ERISA plan under the "established" language. However,
the disjunctive language, "or maintained by," provides another
avenue whereby a third-party administrator scheme may qualify
as a valid ERISA plan. The statutory language does not appear
and one or more employee organizations jointly establish such a program, or
where several employers contribute to a plan established by an employee organization. In each of these contexts there is some organizational relationship among
the employers, or the employees, or both in coming together and establishing a
single plan. But where several unrelated employers, in establishing benefit programs for their unrelated employees, without any concerted "sponsor" or
"settlor" activity, merely execute identically worded "trust agreements,"
"subscription agreements," or similar documents offered by an independent
third party as a means to fund benefits, no multiple employer plan can be
recognized. In such a situation, each employer (or each bona fide employer
association) establishes its own plan, and the entity contracted with to provide
benefits is not itself an employee benefit plan, but the provider of a funding
vehicle to the various plans. We believe that this description fits IBT. Accordingly, we have determined that IBT, as an entity, is not a multiple employer
plan subject to ERISA. This, of course, does not mean that individual employers
or bona fide employer associations which have associated themselves with IBT
have not established individual employee welfare benefit plans subject to the
coverage of ERISA or that persons who act in fiduciary capacities with respect
to those plans are not subject to the fiduciary obligations imposed by part 4 of
Title 1 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 6 1101 et seq.
Id.
91. See note 75 supra.
92. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
93. ERISA 6 3(1), 29 U.S.C. 6 1002(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
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to prohibit an independent third party from organizing the MET
by deliberately aligning the unrelated employers' interests such
t h a t t h e employers thereafter "maintain" the plan as a
"cognizable" group adhering to a definite "organizational relationship." It would seem improper, therefore, for the Department
to focus on the "established" language of the ERISA definition
to the complete exclusion of the "maintenance" language.
A second difficulty with the Labor Department's interpretation of multiple-employer plans results from its apparent policy
against third-party administrators. The Department's position
that third-party administration arrangements are only a funding
vehicle is at cross purposes with the congressional objective of
increasing the availability of cost-efficient employee benefit plans
to small employers. For example, the General Accounting Office
reports that ERISA was a major factor in the decision to terminate in the case of about forty-one percent of the employee benefit
plans with fewer than 100 participants that terminated between
mid-1975 and mid-1977.g4The desire to eliminate or reduce high
administrative costs was cited as the most predominate ERISA
factor that affected decisions to terminate. The Department's
exclusion of third-party administrators in effect eliminates the
most economical method for small employers to distribute their
administrative costs among a larger pool of participants. Thus,
by excluding entrepreneurial schemes from federal regulation and
placing them under the more stringent regulation of state insurance departments, the Labor Department, in large measure,
would destroy the incentives behind the very administrative and
financial arrangement that makes adoption of cost-viable MET
plans attractive to small employers.VI'he Labor Department
should carefully evaluate the ramifications of its latest position
before fully implementing it.
In any event, the Department's earlier support for state regulation of bogus employee organization MET's that is now being
extended to include state regulation of alleged bogus employer
association uninsured MET's implicitly denotes a more accomodating view by federal officials toward state insurance departments? Although this is by no means an indefensible position,
94. See [I9791 PENS.
REP.(BNA) No. 236, at A-13 (Apr. 23, 1979).
95. It should be acknolwedged, on the other hand, that the establishment of a thirdparty administrator arrangement does not necessarily guarantee cost efficiency. As has
been seen in cases such as Bell, entrepreneurial schemes also present enticing opportunities for abuse and exploitation if effective controls are not employed.
96. The Labor Department would probably dispute any suggestion that it is accomo-
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it ne~ert~heless
could be argued that the Department has reversed
its earlier stance and abdicated a portion of its congressionally
mandated position of total preemption.
In summarv. although it is impossible to predict the outcome
of IPRT (II) and its resulting impact upon the whole field of
uninsured MET's, it is hoped that the court will seize this opportunity to squarely confront the issues and reach a definitive determination.

V. ALTERNATIVES
FOR RESOLVING
THE UNINSURED
MET REGULATORY
CONTROVERSY
In order to resolve the uninsured MET regulatory controversy, two questions must be answered: (1)Where should the line
be drawn between state and federal reiulation of uninsured
MET's, and (2) who should draw the line-the Congress, the
Labor Department, or the judiciary?
A.

Where to Draw the Line?

The question of where the line between state and federal
regulation of uninsured MET's should be drawn can be stated
more precisely: Should ERISA's definition of employee benefit
plans be interpreted to encompass more of the field of uninsured
MET's? Whereas a move to bring more of the field of uninsured
MET's within the definition of an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan would strengthen ERISA's preemption provisions, a move
to define more uninsured MET's as not qualifying as employee
benefit plans would enlarge the regulatory powers of state insurance departments?
Some observers have noted that while it is not at all clear
that ERISA's preemption provisions will be clarified or r e ~ i s e d , ' ~
no consensus exists, even among those who favor revision of the
section 514 language, as to whether the preemptive language
dating state regulation within the employee benefit field; rather, it would likely point out
that the "bogus" nature of the alleged "employee organization" or "employer association"
uninsured MET's confirms the fact that such entities were never properly considered to
be within the definitional confines of an employee benefit plan.
97. Four public policy considerations favoring state regulations of uninsured
multiple-employer welfare trusts (UMEWT's) are: (1) disparity in bargaining power between participating employers and the UMEWT's; (2) the soliciting and advertising of
employee benefit "plans" to the public; (3) the very real potential for UMEWT insolvencies; and (4) the administrative incapacity of the Department of Labor to properly supervise UMEWT activities. See Brummond, supra note 1, a t 713.
98. Turza & Halloway, supra note 19, a t 212.
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should be expanded or restricted.'' This lack of agreement suggests that policy considerations will play an increasingly important role in the final outcome. Two factors argue particularly
persuasively in favor of total preemption: (1)Congress' intent to
occupy the field of employee benefit plans, thereby displacing all
state regulation^,^^ and (2) the national interest in uniformity
with respect to interstate plansY" Support for these two factors
is found in the plain language of section 514.Io2
Conversely, several factors argue with equal force in behalf
of greater state participation in the regulation of uninsured
MET's. First is the existing expertise and enforcement machinery
of the state insurance departments as compared with that of the
Labor Department?" Second, there is a national interest in leaving regulation of insurance matters to the individual states.Io4The
third factor is the need for prompt and decisive action in the
public interest. Finally, the federal government has failed to
adopt minimum standards for uninsured MET's or to refine
ERISA definitions.

R.

Who Draws the Line?

The lack of consensus concerning revision of the language in
ERISA's preemption provisions explains in part why no one has
99. Compare ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, at 535 (statement of ERISA
Industry Committee) (supporting current broad preemptive language) and H.R. REP.941785, supra note 7, a t 46-49 (recommending strengthening of broad preemptive language)
with ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t 650 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W.
Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force) (advocating amendments
to restrict preemptive language).
100. See ERISA O 2, 29 U.S.C. 9 1001 (1976) (Congressional declaration of policy);
H.R. REP.94-1785, supra note 7, a t 46-49.
101. See H.R. REP. 94-1785, supra note 7, a t 46-49. See also note 23 supra.
102. See Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968) (absent
persuasive reasons to the contrary, the words of a statute are given their ordinary meaning).
103. During 1977 the Labor Department received 1.5 million ERISA reports and
230,000 inquiries regarding ERISA compliance. Consequently, on the average, every employee in the Plans Benefit Security Division of the Labor Department would have had
to review 2680 ERISA filings and respond to 412 ERISA inquiries. ERISA Oversight
Hearings, supra note 7, a t 670 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman
of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force). NAIC also points out that in the field of
"welfare" benefits, unlike the field of employee pension benefits, the types of benefits
offered are quite diverse in nature; therefore, the increased complexity in handling claims
raises administrative costs. Id. at 669. See also Complaint for Plaintiff a t 2, Insurance &
Prepaid Benefits Trust v. Marshall, No. CV 7903029 RMT (PX) (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 9,
1979) (an employee welfare benefit plan administrator allegedly waited for over three
years for an answer to his status inquiry).
104. See text accompanying notes 27, 28 supra.
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taken decisive action to resolve the matter. With respect to uninsured MET's specifically, three groups are in a position to offer a
remedv: the Congress, the Labor Department, and the judiciary.
I.

Congress-remedia 1 legislation

When Congress decided to adopt the joint committee's recommendation for a much broader preemption provision than had
been earlier proposed by either house,lMit anticipated that modifications and improvements would necessarily follow; hence, provision was made for the establishment of a Pension Task Force"'"
to study the consequences of ERISA's implementation and to
report its findings back to Congress.lo7Although the Pension Task
Force has conducted hearings on the subject, no legislative refinement affecting uninsured MET's has occurred to date.IoxThe
chances of legislation in the near future appear to be growing
slimmer.'" The present pessimism stems in part from the changing provisions of remedial legislation introduced by two of
~
ERISA's original sponsors, Senators Williams and J a ~ i t s . "These
two influential Senators have twice introduced versions of remedial legislation-S. 301711'and S. 209,'12 with the latter currently
pending. Both versions of the proposed legislation would amend
portions of section 514 to reinforce the federal government's claim
to full preemption with only limited exceptions.":' The earlier

'

105. See note 23 supra.
106. ERISA Q Q 3021,3022,29 U.S.C. 8 4 1221,1222 (1976) (establishment and duties).
107. Senator Javits of the Conference Committee explained:
The conferees-recognizing the dimensions of such a policy-also agreed to
assign the Congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of studying and
evaluating preemption in connection with State authorities and reporting its
findings to the Congress. If it is determined that the preemption policy devised
has the effect of precluding essential legislation a t either the State or Federal
level, appropriate modifications can be made.
120 CONG.
REC. 29,942 (1974).
108. A number of specific amendments to restrict the preemptive scope of ERISA's
4 514 language have been offered by NAIC. Important recommended changes affecting
uninsured MET'S would redefine the terms "employee organization" and "employer." See
ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t 672-76 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W.
Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force).
REP.(BNA) No. 221, a t A-20 (Jan. 8, 1979).
109. See 119791 PENS.
110. Senator Harrison Williams is the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare. Senator Jacob Javits is the ranking minority member of the same
committee.
111. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.REC. S 6592 (daily ed. May 1, 1978).
112. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
113. The pending legislation, S. 209, would underscore ERISA's broad preemptive
powers by adding to the end of subsection (b)(2)(B) of 8 514 the following:

.
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version, S. 3017, as introduced in the 95th Congress, suggested
two major refinements concerning uninsured MET'S that have
particular application here. First, section 201(b)(1) provided a
definitional clarification of the term "employee organization."".'
Second, section 266 authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate solvency and reserve standard regulations for uninsured welfare trusts.11% surprising contrast, S. 209, as introduced, apparently emasculates one provisionH6and deletes the other:11iUnless
changes occur, the probable result will be that Congress, in time,
will underscore the broad preemptive language of section 514,IiX
leaving the unwanted task of precise line-drawing to the Labor
Department or the judiciary.
2. Labor Department regulation
The Department of Labor has assumed an increasingly active role in resolving the uninsured MET controversy through the
use of amicus curiae briefs, press releases, and advisory opinions.llS Nevertheless, the Department's efforts have fallen far
A State insurance law which provides that a speciFc benefit or benefits must
be provided or made available by a contract or polir y of insurance issued to an
employee benefit plan is a law which relates to an employee benefit plan within
the meaning of subsection (a) and is not a law which regulates insurance within
the meaning of subparagraph (A) . . . .
Id. 4 155. The pending legislation includes exceptions for "State domestic relations law"
and the "Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Law." Id.
114. The proposed amendment stated in part: "For purposes of this paragraph, the
term 'employees' beneficiary association' shall mean an association in which employees
participate as members and in which eligibility for membership is based on a commonality
of interest with respect to the members' employment relationships." S. 3017,95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 124 CONG.REC.S 6592 (daily ed. May 1, 1978). Compare id. with ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t 675 (statement of NAIC by Herbert W. Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force).
115. S. 3017, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.REC.S 6594 (daily ed. May 1, 1978).
116. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 131 (1979).
117. Id. 4 102.
118. If passed in its present or similar form, S. 209 would have the effect of overruling
the First Circuit's decision in Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 US.980 (1978). ERISA Improvements Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 209 Before
the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (opening statement
of Senator Jacob K. Javits) [hereinafter cited as Improvements Act Hearings, 1979).
Furthermore, the biH would overrule the holding in Standard Oil v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp.
695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), in which the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAWAIIREV.STAT.
§ 4 393-1 to -51 (1976), was preempted. Compare improvements Act Hearings, 1979, supra,
a t 642 (statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye and Hon. Spark Matsunaga, Senators from
the State of Hawaii) (favoring passage of Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act exception) with
id. a t 1053 (statement of H.P. Kneen, Jr., Director of Employee Benefits for IBM) (opposing passage of Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act exception).
119. See, e.g., Letter from Ian D. Lanoff, Labor Department Administrator, to Ed-
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short of concretely defining a valid ERISA-covered employee welfare benefit plan. The Department does not presently contemplate issuing any official regulations regarding uninsured
MET'sI2" despite a resolution from one stateI2' urging such a formulation. Whether the reason for the Department's reticence be
caution to ensure the development of foolproof regulations, deference to Congress' anticipated remedial legislation, an election to
attack the problem on a case-by-case basis, or simply indecision,
the Department's inaction has created a number of serious problems. For instance, it has caused a rift between the Labor Department and state insurance departments that have been forced to
This apparent
expend substantial time and money in 1itigati0n.l~~
schism in governmental regulation of uninsured MET'S is unfortunate in view of the fact that the Secretary of Labor is authorized to make "arrangements or agreements for cooperation or
mutual assistance in the performance of his functions" on a reimbursable or other basis with state departments and agencies, such
as state insurance departments.lZ3Congress granted the Secretary
this authorization for t h e express purpose of avoiding
"unnecessary expense and duplication of functions among Government agencies."i24In addition, the Department's inaction has
produced a cloud of uncertainty over uninsured MET administrators and organizers who are genuinely attempting to bring their
operations into conformity with ERISA's provisions.
3. Judicial determination

Although several federal courts have justifiably expressed
the view t h a t the resolution of ERISA-related controversies
should be handled by Congress rather than by the c0urts,~*5tnow
appears that a judicial determination of the uninsured M E T
ward N. Getoor, President, Multiple Fund Administrators, Inc. (June 29,1979), reprinted
in 119791 PENS.REP.(BNA) No. 250, a t R-28, 29 (Jul. 30, 1979).
120. Telephone interview with Wayland B. Coe, Acting Assistant Administrator for
Reporting and Plan Standards, Pension and Welfare Benefits Program, Dep't of Labor
(Nov. 15, 1979).
121. Improvements Act Hearings, 1979, supra note 118, a t 1314 (California Joint
REP. (BNA) No. 199, at A-18 (July 31, 1978).
Resolution No. 43). See [I9781 PENS.
122. ERISA Oversight Hearings, supra note 7, a t 660 (statement of NAIC by Herbert
W. Anderson, Chairman of NAIC ERISA Preemption Task Force).
123. ERISA 6 506, 29 U.S.C. 6 1136 (1976).
124. Id.
125. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
980 (1978); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd,571 F.2d
502 (9th Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
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question is both desirable and necessary. Until a consensus is
achieved in Congress, some protection must be afforded to the
public against abuses in the uninsured MET field.
In anticipation of the judicial determination to come, several
factors indicate that the courts may be inclined to increase the
state's regulatory role over uninsured MET's. First is the emerging conservative disposition of the Burger Court to allow the accomodation of state regulation that does not conflict with or imSecond, the Labor Department
pinge upon federal reg~1ation.l~~
has apparently deferred to state insurance departments in the
regulation of "bogus employer association" uninsured MET's.
Third, there is a vital public interest in sealing off any regulatory
void that might cause injury to the working public. Fourth is the
recognition that if Congress is opposed to a constriction on absolute preemption, remedial legislation can rectify the situation.
Although a judicial determination to permit increased state
regulatory power over uninsured MET's may provide short term
relief, any move in that direction will necessarily require further
judicial entanglement in the complex line-drawing controversy.
Perhaps the more prudent approach for the courts to pursue is
that advocated by the plaintiff in IPBT (II). The plaintiff requested a court mandate directing the Labor Department to recognize IPBT as a valid employee benefit plan under ERISA.
Since the Labor Department is charged with the supervision of
ERISA plans generally and possesses the power to promulgate
definitive regulations, the court may be well-advised to order the
Department to assume regulatory jurisdiction over IPBT and
other uninsured MET'S-a duty arguably mandated by the plain
wording of ERISA's preemption provisions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Recent events have again called into question the jurisdictional bounds between state insurance departments and federal
regulators in the field of uninsured MET's. The judicial consensus that emerged from Ham berlin and Bell, permitting state regulation of certain plans, may be of limited application because of
the unusual fact settings involved. The principal question now
pending before the courts is whether an alleged employee benefit
plan's definitional qualification under ERISA provisions or the
126. See generally Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U . ILL.

L.F.515; Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM.
L. REV.623 (1975).

9131

ERISA

939

plan's substantive nature should be controlling in determining a
plan's ERISA status. The difficulty of the line-drawing procedure
is compounded because of Congress' and the Labor Department's
failure to act affirmatively and decisively in resolving the matter.
Clearly, primary responsibility to clarify ERISA's preemption
provisions rests upon Congress-the originator of the legislation.
Nevertheless, given the weight of the competing policy issues-none of which is apparently capable of commanding a congressional majority a t present-it does not reasonably appear
that remedial legislation can be expected in the immediate future.
Although the congressional stalemate is perhaps understandable, the Labor Department's minimal efforts are inexcusable.
The Labor Department received a direct congressional mandate
to implement and administer ERISA. That mandate included the
power to promulgate official regulations as the need arises. Yet
despite the magnitude of the existing problem and the pervasive
uncertainty regarding regulatory jurisdiction over uninsured
MET'S, the Labor Department continues to refrain from promulgating regulations.
Because of both the Labor Department's reluctance to act
and the Congress' division over preemption questions, the judiciary by default has inherited the unenviable task of providing an
interim solution. Although the courts in the past have engaged in
the uninsured MET line-drawing controversy, and may elect to
continue to do so now, the better approach would be for the
judiciary to place the responsibility where it belongs: on the Congress and the Labor Department. The courts are powerless to
compel Congress to act in this situation; the same is not true,
however, with regard to the Labor Department. The courts should
exercise their powers of mandate to order the Labor Department
to recognize under ERISA those parties in litigation that qualify
as valid ERISA employee benefit plans. Perhaps this judicial
leverage will induce the Labor Department to promulgate needed
regulations or stimulate Congress to consider and enact sorely
needed remedial legislation.

John A. Adams

